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REGARDING A REAPPRAISAL
JOSEPH

D.

GARLAND

f

18 of the Decedent Estate Law has become a
Pandora's box, from which confusion and its companion,
litigation, have been released. Moreover, Section 18 does not
always do the job it was designed to do. A serious reappraisal seems in order, in the light of present day economic
and social conditions, not only of the mechanics of Section
18, but of the purposes and objectives to be obtained by a
"non-barrable" share as well. Does hope still remain in the
section ?
ECTION

WHY A "NoN-BARRABLE"

SHARE?

Any contemplation of Section 18 should be divorced from
emotion, but from the very nature of the relationships involved this is difficult to do. An image readily conjured is
that of the aged, loving and loved wife who suddenly finds
herself a forlorn and destitute widow. But in reality, Section 18 is probably not needed or used when the couple has
lived together in a normal, non-antagonistic relationship.1
It can certainly be presumed that, in such a case, the hus-

band will do his best to provide for his widow.2 The problems raised by the May-December romance or by plans formulated around estate tax considerations are easily solved
by the waiver of the right of electionA

Section 18 is gen-

Professor of Law, St. John's University School
t1 The
rapidly growing field of estate planning

of Law.
is based extensively on this

hypothesis.
2 The extensive use of the estate tax marital deduction, in INT. REV. CoDE
OF 1954, § 2056, and N.Y. TAx LAW § 249-s (3), verifies this conclusion.
Of
course the author is aware that widowers also have a right of election. In
the interest of simplicity, however, and in view of the author's difficulty in
finding another suitable synonym for "surviving spouse," the wife will be used,
for illustrative purposes, as the survivor. This happens most of the time
anyway.
3 N.Y. DxCED. EST. LAW § 18(9).
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erally called into play, however, when the relationship of the
parties has deteriorated to the stage that the husband has
little or no love or affection for his wife, but not to the stage
that the wife has forfeited her rights, as by divorce, separation and so forth. Of course, the situation should not be
ignored where the mere existence of Section 18 makes a
loving husband more generous than he otherwise would be.
On the other hand, the estate tax marital deduction probably
exerts a greater influence in this area than does Section 18.
In any event, should it be a policy of the law to compel a
husband to be more liberal towards the widow than the needs
of the situation and natural love and affection dictate? On
balance, it would appear that Section IS is called into play
by the widow, who, as a wife, had a strained relationship
with her husband.
In addition, in evaluating the policy considerations behind Section 18, modern social welfare legislation and the
trend in private retirement and pension plans should form
part of the background. These are factors which were unknown to the architects of Section 18. In 1930, the wife had
no interest in the husband's earned income, at least in so far
as it was spent. Social Security 4 and some private employee
plans I are, however, forms of enforced savings of earnings
in which the wife does acquire an interest. For example,
Social Security survivor's benefits are available to the widow,
if the deceased had earned income in a covered occupation.
In most cases where Section 18 would have any significance
this would amount to a monthly tax-free income of 81.40
for a surviving widow at age sixty-five.'
This amount is
payable regardless of the wishes of the decedent. 7 In addi4 The Federal Insurance Contributions Act, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 3101-25, imposes a tax on the covered employee based on his earnings.

5 Clearly this would be so if the plans are contributory. It might also be
true of non-contributory plans if it could be shown that wages were affected
by the plan.
6 Social Security Act § 202(e), 42 U.S.C.A. § 40 2 (e) (Supp. 1957). The
provisions for a surviving widower are contained in Social Security Act
§ 202(f), 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(f) (Supp. 1957). In the case of the widower, he
must have been supported by the wife. The widow may receive benefits in a
lesser amount at age 62. Social Security Act § 2 16(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 416(a) (2) (Supp. 1957).
7 The amendments made in 1957 repealed the former requirement that
the wife be living with the husband at the time of his death, Pub. L. 85-238,
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tion, many private pension plans provide for payments either
in a lump sum or in the form of an annuity to survivors of
a deceased employee. At times, the plan automatically designates the relationship necessary to participate in the benefits, in a manner somewhat similar to the intestacy provisions
of Section 83, and the employee has no say in the matter.8
The same is usually true of employer-contributed group insurance. These programs have, in effect, given a surviving
spouse an interest in the deceased's earnings apart from Section 18, and may also have lessened the seriousness of the
problem in the case of widows of deceased recipients of earned
income.
Of course, the question remains as to the compulsory
share of excess earnings, unspent and saved, which must be
made available to the survivor.
In conclusion, then, the situation in which Section 18
has the greatest impact and which deserves the major consideration is that of the somewhat estranged spouse of a person who is or has become the owner of property capable of
producing income. But this is precisely the area where the
husband can, most easily, defeat the "non-barrable" share
by inter vivos transfers and the form of the ownership of
property. Section 18 has never fairly faced up ,to this
problem.
In the light of these considerations, the evaluation must
be made. Should the surviving spouse receive a compulsory
share in the estate? If the answer is "no," of course, our
discussion can cease. But, if the determination is that a
"non-barrable" share is socially desirable, the further questions of the size of the share and the prevention of evasion
must be resolved.

§ 3(c). The requirement of living together remains for the lump sum payments, however. Social Security Act §202(i), 42 U.S.C.A. §402(i) (Supp.

1957).

The 1957 amendments also provide that the survivor's insurance benefits
are payable if the parties were not validly divorced under local law at the time
of death. Social Security Law § 216(h) (1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 416(b) (1) (Supp.
1957). Thus the grounds for forfeiture of benefits have been reduced.
Cf. N.Y. DacED. EsT. LAW §§ 18(3)-(5).
8Cf. Meldram & Fewsmith, Inc. 20 T.C. 790 (1953); U.S. Treas. Reg.
§ 1401-1(b) (4); Rev. Rul. 54-398, 1954-2 Cum. BULL. 239.
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THE SHARE

As has been pointed out in Surrogate Cox's article, inflation has caught up with Section 18. No matter how
wealthy the husband, the will can provide that the widow
is to receive no more than $2,500 outright-a modest figure
that could stand re-evaluation. The balance of the survivor's
"Section 18 intestate share" may be placed in trust for the
widow for life. Thus a husband with a Section 18 estate of
307,500 (a substantial administered estate by any standards), survived by a widow and child, can provide by will
that the widow is to receive $2,500 in cash and a life interest
in a trust of $100,000. Since this equitable life estate is a
"terminable interest" which does not qualify for the estate
tax marital deduction,10 the corpus of the trust will have to
bear its portion of the estate taxes, absent some direction to
Since the corpus of the trust
the contrary in the will."
would bear the brunt of approximately one-third of the total
estate tax of over $64,000,12 it would be reduced to approximately $79,000.13 Assuming a liberal return of four per cent
after commissions, the surviving spouse would receive a
yearly taxable income of only $3,160. Is this enough? For
the widow of a comparatively wealthy husband does this
amount to a substantial disinheritance? But consider the
situation, discussed above, in which Section 18 has its greatest impact.
On the other hand, in determining the compulsory share,
Section 18 at present makes no allowance for provisions made
for the spouse outside the probate estate; as for example, insurance, inter vivos gifts, or even Social Security or private
pension plans. Thus under that section, a widow would have
a right of election even though insurance proceeds payable
9N.Y. DECED. EsT. LAW § 18(1) (d).
10 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §2056(b) ; N.Y.
Il N.Y. DE ED. EsT. LAW § 124(2).
22

TAX LAW

§249-s(3) (b).

The exact figure for the federal estate tax is $64,200.

Thus the
taxable estate for federal purposes would be $305,000 and under § 124 of the
Decedent Estate Law the share of the taxes borne by the trust would be
100,000
13 The $2,500 in cash would qualify for the marital deduction.

X 64,200 or $21,049.18.
305,000
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to her far exceed any "Section 18 intestate share." This is
a consideration which should be re-examined.
Thus far, in considering the mechanics of the "nonbarrable" share, difficulties have merely been raised and no
solution offered. They are matters of policy. One aspect of
the percentage of the "Section 18 intestate share" must be
raised which demands revision as a-matter of justice.
As presently constructed, Section 18 provides that the
minimum a surviving spouse can receive, in trust or otherwise, is the Section 83 intestate share with a ceiling on this
minimum of one-half the Section 18 probate estate. 1 4 Since
this ceiling will always be reached unless the decedent is
survived by issue, 15 this provision results in the widow's share
in the estate being reduced if the decedent is survived by a
child, regardless of the amount actually devised or bequeathed
to the child. In all cases, except when a step-child is in the
picture, a widow will be penalized under Section 18, simply
because she bore a child. The sponsors of the legislation undoubtedly had in mind the normal situation where the decedent would leave the excess of his property over the Section 18 share to his children, but no such requirement is
embodied in the section; except in the case of unmentioned and unprovided for after-borns,' 6 there is no "nonbarrable" share for issue. 1 7 Thus, presently, collaterals and
friends 's can profit at the expense of both widow and child.
There appears to be no justification for reducing the
surviving spouse's share simply because of the birth of issue.
If the issue are provided for, that is another matter. Since
children have a natural claim to a father's bounty, the solu14 N.Y. DECED. EsT. LAW § 18(1), § 18(1) (a).
35 In every other case, the intestate share of a surviving spouse under N.Y.
DECED. EST. LAW § 83 is in excess of 50% of the estate.
16 N.Y. DcED. EsT. LAW § 26.
17 An interesting case dealing with the interaction of N.Y. DECED. EsT.
LAW § 18 and § 26 is It re Vicedomini, 285 App. Div. 62, 136 N.Y.S.2d 259
(1st Dep't 1954). The will, which did not mention after-borns, gave half the
decedent's estate to his wife and the other half to collaterals. A child was
later born and shortly thereafter the testator died. The widow cleverly elected
to take against the will. The after-born and the widow completely cut out the
collaterals.
18 They could possibly include a person with whom the decedent had engaged in a meretricious relationship.
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tion to this difficulty would not appear to lie in increasing
the surviving spouse's share to one-half in all cases.
As a compromise therefore, it is suggested that in any
revision of Section 18, the share be stated as: one-half of
the estate (as hereinafter defined), reduced, but not below
one-third of such estate, by amounts devised or bequeathed
(or deemed to be devised and bequeathed) 19 to the children of
the deceased, and such persons as legally represent the children if any of them have died before the deceased.
This provision would not decrease the freedom of testation below the presently accepted standard of one-half of the
Section 18 estate, but would prevent a windfall of free testation arising from the birth of issue.
AVOIDANCE OR EVASION

Linked inescapably with the mechanics of Section 18
and the percentage of the share is the question-share of
what? This problem has plagued the courts and has led to
the creation of the concept of "illusory transfer" which has
ebbed 20 and flowed 21 since its formulation in Newman v.
Dore.22 On the one hand, assets forming part of the estate,
testamentary dispositions, are subject to the "non-barrable"
share, either in intestacy under Section 83, or testacy under
Section 18. On the other hand, assets completely transferred
by the decedent during his lifetime are not subject to the
"non-barrable" share. Transfers which have characteristics
in between these extremes have led to the battles between
widow and "donee."
Again the question must be posed: is the "non-barrable"
share worth having? If it is, how much protection should
be afforded to the surviving spouse? If it is, isn't it hypocritical to permit transfers wherein the donor retains effective dominion and control during his lifetime, such as, for
example, by Totten Trust, to stand up against the attack of
the widow?
19The parenthetical phrases could be inserted, if, as suggested later, the
scope of the estate subject to the § 18 election is broadened.
20 Matter of Halpern, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E2d 120 (1951).
21 Krause v. Krause, 285 N.Y. 27, 32 N.E.2d 779 (1941).
22275 N.Y. 391, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
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Estate tax collectors faced a somewhat similar problem
in determining what assets should be the measure of the estate as computed for tax purposes. The law framed a solution based2 4on real ownership 23 rather than the niceties of

legal title.

A somewhat similar approach for the solution of Section 18 problems appears to have been begun in NTewman v.
Dore,2 5 but it never matured into a system. Perhaps a reason
for this is that a government treasury is better organized
and more effective than disinherited spouses. But probably
the most significant consideration which stunted this growth
is that Section 18 was rooted in the past and was an offspring of dower and curtesy, common-law property rights,
which it replaced. It was the natural and logical thing, then,
for the courts to look to common-law property and title concepts to determine the scope of the section. 26 Estate taxation, however, like Venus, burst on the scene without any
readily determinable ancestry.
Of the two, the tax approach is the much to be preferred.2 7 Section 18 already accepts the theory that it is the
wealth of the husband which determines the amount that the
surviving spouse may take.2 8 Why should wealth be restricted to legal wealth and not include real wealth although
technical title is in someone else? If the husband enjoys
the benefits of the property up until the time of his death,
the widow would seem to be entitled to use the value of this
property as a measuring rod in determining the size of her
"non-barrable" share.
1954, §§ 2036-40.
See, e.g., Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
Compare: "Perhaps 'from the technical point of view such conveyance
does not quite take all that it gives, but practically it does.'" Newman v.
Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 381, 9 N.E.2d 966, 969 (1937), with: "It is hard to imagine
that respondent felt himself the poorer after this trust had been executed....
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 336 (1940) (an income tax case).
26 In Krause v. Krause, 285 N.Y. 27, 32 N.E.2d 779 (1941), the decedent
had conveyed real property to his sons reserving to himself a life estate. The
court upheld the transfer as against attack by the widow on the ground that
the decedent had divested himself of an interest in real estate "in accordance
with the essential forms of law." Id. at 32, 32 N.E.2d at 780.
27 It has already been advocated. See Cahn, Restraints on Disinheritance,
85 U. PA. L. REv. 139 (1936).
28 It is a percentage of his estate.
23 INT. REV. CODE OF

24
25
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Accepting the principle that the real wealth of the decedent should be the key consideration, however, raises the
further question as to the standards to be employed in determining real wealth.
Under existing law, the label "illusory" has been placed
only on transfers made by the husband wherein he has reserved 1) a life estate, and 2) a power to revoke, and 3) broad
powers of management.2 9 Even the existence of these three
elements has not always resulted in such a characterization. 30
An acceptance of the tax analogy would, however, make the
presence of either one of the first two types of interests a
basis for the inclusion of the property within the measuring
rod of "non-barrable" share.3 1 In addition, it would cover
transfers made in contemplation of death,3 2 apparently over34
33
looked at present by Section 18, annuities, joint interests,
of appointment, 5
property subject to the exercise of a power
36
insurance.
and the proceeds of some life
Whether the limits of Section 18 should be the same as
those employed for tax purposes or whether they should be
contracted or expanded is a policy decision which the legislature can and ought to make. The courts, hampered by
other considerations, for example the Banking Law in Matter
of Halpern 37 have been unwilling to draw the line. There is
precedent for legislative specification of the scope of the protection to be afforded a surviving spouse. In answer to prob29 Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937); Mac Gregor v.
Fox, 280 App. Div. 435, 114 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1st Dep't 1952), affd without
opinion, 305 N.Y. 576, 111 N.E.2d 445 (1953).
3o Matter of Halpern, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951); Inda v. Inda,

288 N.Y. 315, 43 N.E.2d 59 (1942).

RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS

§ 57 (2d ed.,

Tent. Draft No. 4, at 1, 1957), approved at the 1957 meeting of the American
Law Institute, adopts this position.
31 INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 2036 (life estate); id. §§ 2036 (a) (2), 2038
(power to change the beneficial interests or to alter, amend or revoke). The
mere retention of broad powers of management would apparently not be enough.
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929).
32 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2035. The tax concept is far broader and more
inclusive than the common-law gift causa mortis. United States v. Wells,
283 U.S. 102 (1931).
33 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2039.
34 Id. § 2040.
35 Id.
36 Id.

§ 2041.
§ 2042.
37303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951) (involved §239(2) of the New
York Banking Law which expressly recognizes Totten Trusts).
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lems raised by the courts, 38 Section 18(1) (h) was added in
1936 to provide an enumeration of administrative controls
which may be exercised by the fiduciary of a Section 18 life
estate.3 9
Legislative definition of the property to be included
within the Section 18 estate without regard to common-law
property concepts would not be a departure from the policy
originally formulated by Newman v. Dore. It has the advantage, difficult to obtain through court decisions, on the one
hand, of considerably broadening the protection afforded the
surviving spouse and, on the other, of perhaps benefiting
other beneficiaries of a decedent's largesse. Since property
in which the decedent had retained some dominion or control would be included within the measuring rod of the "nonbarrable" share, the amount of such property already in the
hands of the surviving spouse as a result of the husband's
death would also be included in the measure of the actual
share of the surviving spouse. For example, certain insurance proceeds received by the surviving spouse might be includible in the Section 18 estate and thus would also be considered as received by her in satisfaction of her share. As
an uncomplicated illustration: the widow of a decedent dying
without issue would have no right of election if lie devised
and bequeathed all his property, valued at $20,000, to his
mother but had owned a life insurance policy in the amount
of $20,000 payable to his wife: if the other property had a
value of $40,000, the Section 18 estate would amount to
$60,000 and the widow would have the right to receive $10,000
of this other property.
Again, unfortunately, the solution of one problem, the
amount of the "non-barrable" share, creates a new one--who
pays it? Again, unfortunately, there is no adequate judicial
solution available. Matter of Halpern seems to regard
"illusory" as synonymous with testamentary, and its all-ornothing approach would not be applicable to a transfer which
is effective except for determining the share of the surviving
spouse.
38 Matter of Curley, 245 App. Div. 255, 280 N.Y. Supp. 80 (2d Dep't),
aff'd without opinion, 269 N.Y. 548, 199 N.E. 665 (1935).
39 See Draftsman's Note following N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW § 18 (1949).
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Help, however, can again be obtained from statutory
provisions dealing with the estate tax. Section 124 of the
Decedent Estate Law contains detailed rules for the resolution of the essentially similar problem of who shall pay
the estate tax when the gross tax estate contains assets which
are not subject to administration. In general, absent directions to the contrary, each person who receives property subject to the tax bears his pro-rata share of the tax and the
fiduciary is given the power to collect this share from any
person benefited,
even though the assets are not subject to
40
administration.
This solution seems a fair and rational one. It is based
on economic reality, as is the determination of the share itself, rather than upon technicalities of title or priorities of
classes of devises and bequests. Moreover, it embodies the
present rule of abatement when an election is made against
the provisions of a will 41 and merely extends it to property
outside the estate which is used for computing the share of
the surviving spouse. As in the case of the payment of estate
taxes, the directions of the decedent as to the manner of
payment should be respected, as far as possible. 42 For example, a decedent may wish all of his stock in a closely held
corporation to pass intact to his son.
INTESTACY

The courts have wrestled with the problem of "illusory
transfers" in cases of intestacy.4 3 In view of the purpose
behind the existence of Section 18, namely, a conscious decision that some provision ought to be made for the surviving spouse, there seems to be no reason for limiting the area
of protection to cases of testacy. After all, intestacy may
often be the result of a positive choice to let the provisions
40 N.Y. DECED. EsT. LAW § 124.
41 Matter of Byrnes, 149 Misc. 449, 267 N.Y. Supp. 627 (Surr. Ct. 1933);
In re Getz, 115 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Surr. Ct 1952).
42 Cf. In re Boschen, 137 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Surr. Ct. 1954).
43 Cf. Schnakenberg v. Schnakenberg, 262 App. Div. 234, 28 N.Y.S.2d 841
(2d Dep't 1941); Murray v. Brooklyn Say. Bank, 258 App. Div. 132, 15
N.Y.S.2d 915 (1st Dep't 1939). A similar problem exists if the decedent has
left all his, probate property to his wife but has made inter vivos transfers
attacked as "illusory." Cf. Matter of Halpern, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120

(1951).
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of Section 83 operate. 4 4 In any event the need for protection
is the same, and the same property should form the base for
the computation of the surviving spouse's share.
Of course, when certain inter vivos transfers are to be
included in the measure of a surviving spouse's intestate
share, some upper limit will have to be imposed on the percentage of the share. A disposition of property wherein the
donor retains dominion and control is, after all, a disposition
for some purposes 45 and there is no reason why it should
fail completely as would be the case if the husband died survived only by a spouse and remote collaterals, and no percentage limitation were imposed. 46 Therefore, it is suggested
that the "non-barrable" share in intestacy be the greater of
1) the ordinary share under the existing provisions of Section 83, or 2) if any property, which is not part of the ordinary estate of the decedent, is deemed to have been owned
by him-at the time of his death by reason of the decedent's
dominion and control, one-half of the total estate with these
assets included in the measure, reduced, but not below oneincluded in
third of such estate, by the value of the property
47
such estate passing to the issue of decedent.
Such a provision would preserve the basic pattern and
make the necessary correlation between the rights of the
surviving spouse in cases of testacy and intestacy.
IN

SHORT

As can be seen, Section 18 has proved inadequate to
protect the surviving spouse, even though a determination
has been made that such protection is necessary. The fault
does not lie with the courts necessarily because of the background of the section and the problem of "who gets what"
when a transfer is labeled illusory. Legislation is the only
satisfactory solution. And if the interest of the surviving
spouse is not deemed a sufficient reason for amendment,
clarity of law certainly should.
44 Consider the formalities required to revoke a will.
§ 34.

LAW

N.Y. DEcED. EsT.

45 The instrument giving rise to the inter vivos transfer has many of the
elements of a will.
46The surviving spouse would take it all. N.Y. DEcED. EsT. LAw § 83(4).
47 See text at note 15 supra.

